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Nationalpopulism, Right and Left: The Social-National
Synthesis Today.
Daniel Rueda, King’s College London
For most of the postwar period the idea of merging socialist (or popular) and nationalist
elements was marginal in Europe. But in the last two decades we have been witnessing a new
form of social-national synthesis: nationalpopulism. This article examines this resurgence by
comparing right-wing nationalpopulism and left-wing nationalpopulism. In order to do so, it
focuses on four European countries: France, Italy, Greece and Spain. While there are both policy
and discursive similarities between these two forms of nationalpopulism, this article argues that
they are fundamentally different and belong to antagonistic ideological factions. Keywords:
populism, nationalism, Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini, Syriza, Podemos.

Introduction
‘Populism’ is undoubtedly one of today’s most disputed political terms. The
proliferation of literature on the topic has led to a semantic inflation that threatens the
possibility of reaching an operative definition. Its overuse in the mass media, as well as the
fact that it is generally employed in an illocutionary, rather than descriptive, way only adds
to the problem. Moreover, the different forms of populism are often mistaken for one another,
causing a problematic assumption of homogeneity.
This paper does not intend to contribute to the blossoming literature on generic
populism. It will instead examine a variant of populism, nationalpopulism, in its two main
forms, by focusing on the European context. Analyzing the differences between right-wing
nationalpopulism (RWNP) and left-wing nationalpopulism (LWNP) requires a concrete
framework, one that allows an understanding of these phenomena in depth instead of simply
analyzing their surface features. In order to conduct such examination, this work will employ
the theory of populism developed by the Essex School of Discourse Analysis (ESDA) in the
last four decades.
Populism will thus be understood as “a way of constructing the political” (Laclau
2005), rather than as a political style (Moffitt 2016), a thin-centered ideology (Stanley 2008;
Mudde 2014) or a political tactic (Weyland 2001). In order to examine the different faces of
nationalpopulism, this work will thus go beyond ideational and functionalist approaches by
engaging in a discourse analysis as understood by David Howarth (2013) and other members
of the ESDA. Of course, the commitment to associate nationalism and left-wing, or social
demands, is far from being a historical novelty. What is here referred to as the first socialnational synthesis took place between the end of the nineteenth century and the second half
of the twentieth century, when both left-wing and right-wing forces sought either to use the
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power of nationalism for social purposes or to add social and popular elements to their
nationalist projects (Sternhell 1994, 6). What we have been witnessing in the last two decades,
in a context of neoliberal globalization, is the emergence of a second social-national synthesis
in Europe, although this time in the form of an amalgamation of post-1945 nationalism with a
non-revolutionary type of populism.
Nationalpopulist discourses will be considered as contemporary phenomena, rather
than as the return of any concrete political tendency. Yet referring to past attempts to creating
a social-national or popular-national synthesis can be valuable. This paper will regard them
as proof of a recurrent practice within modern societies that now takes new historical forms.
Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès or Enrico Corradini therefore play the same role here that Joseph de
Maistre could have in an essay on fascism or François-Noël Babeuf in an account of
communism, that is, not as part of the object of study but as historical precedents that can help
us to understand it.
Both RWNP and LWNP are here considered forms of nationalism. It is certainly not
the first time that nationalism emerges as a product of the hybridization between national
consciousness and a concrete political tendency (Álvarez Junco 2017). After all, nationalism
has been combined with ideals of liberty against absolute monarchs both in America and
Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as the democratic struggles
during the 1848 revolutions, with reactionary and imperialist goals between the nineteenth
century and the fascist era, with socialism in the USSR under Stalin’s regime, as well as in
Cuba, Yugoslavia, and China, with anti-colonial movements in Asia and Africa, and with
religious affiliations in countries like Iran and Israel. This is why Anthony D. Smith describes
nationalism as a movement “with chameleon-like adaptability” (Smith 1998, 44).
This paper is divided in two sections following the section on methodological
clarifications. The first explores RWNP by analyzing a series of contemporary political
discourses. It will mainly focus on two European countries that have been witness to the rise
of right-wing populist parties in the last decade: Italy and France. The second part examines
LWNP by focusing on two European nations which are at the origin of the two most successful
left-wing populist parties of the continent: Spain and Greece. This case selection allows for an
exploration of the differences between the two forms of European nationalpopulism in
heterogeneous contexts.
Methodology: the Essex School of Discourse Analysis
This article employs the theory of populism formulated by the Essex School of
Discourse Analysis since the eighties as its framework. Its key constituents are Ernesto Laclau
(the author of On Populist Reason), Chantal Mouffe (co-author of Hegemony and Socialist
Strategy), David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval, Yannis Stavrakakis (editors of Discourse Theory and
Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change) and Jason Glynos (co-author of Logics
of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory).
Their framework questions the division between linguistic and extralinguistic realities by
formulating a notion of ‘discourse’ influenced both by post-structuralist authors such as
Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, and by linguistic pragmatists such as Ludwig
Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 105-108). It starts from the premise
that “every object is constituted as an object of discourse,” which in no case implies
questioning the existence of social or material reality (108-110). It is thus a rejection of
epistemological formalism that emphasizes the importance of political and social aspects of
49
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the production of knowledge.
Using this theoretical frame, Ernesto Laclau analyzed the way collective political
identities are formed in his seminal work On Populist Reason (2005). He did so through an
examination of populism, a way of constructing the political that he, as an Argentinean who
witnessed the rise and fall of Peronism, knew well. According to Laclau, the unit of analysis
when scrutinizing political groups should not be the class or the individual, but rather the
different demands which, once articulated, compose a collective identity (Laclau 2005, IX).
The process of articulation is defined as ‘‘any practice establishing a relationship among
elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (Laclau
and Mouffe 1985, 105). Laclau designates two types of demands: democratic and popular.
Democratic demands are those which remain isolated, while popular demands are those
which are part of a populist formation (Laclau 2005, 74).
The result of the articulatory practices is the emergence of a discursive formation
(Laclau 2005, 87). Here, Laclau refers to the populist movement or party (but more broadly to
any political identity) by using a linguistic metaphor, following David Howarth’s definition
of discourses as “concrete systems of social relations and practices that are intrinsically
political, as their formation is an act of radical institution which involves the construction of
antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers between insiders and outsiders” (Howarth
2000, 9). The content of any particular element (for example, a demand, a word, a stance…)
depends on the discursive formation in which it is inscribed. In other words, the signifiers
‘our nation’ or ‘the people’ can only be understood as parts of the political structure they are
part of. This approach avoids the misconception that right-wing and left-wing populist
movements must be similar since their discourses sometimes semantically overlap.
The construction of equivalential links between the demands, essential for the
cohesion of the movement, depends on the production of empty signifiers. This is a concept
borrowed from Jacques Lacan’s work. Laclau (2005) defines the empty signifier as “a
particularity embodying an unachievable fullness” (71). In this context, ‘signifier’ is
understood in its widest sense. It can be a symbol, such as a word, a flag, an icon, or a leader,
and in any case it will have to be the product of a “radical investment,” which means that
there will be an important affective relation between ‘the people’ and that empty signifier (97).
The operation whereby a particularity takes an “incommensurable universal
connotation” is what Laclau calls ‘hegemony’ (70), an important term with several meanings
in the history of Marxist thought (Anderson 2017). Therefore, “in a hegemonic relation, one
particular difference [for example, a national symbol] assumes the representation of a totality
that exceeds it,” which leads us to the notion of synecdoche, a rhetorical device whereby the
part of something represents its totality. According to Laclau (2005), the synecdoche “is not
simply one more rhetorical device, simply to be taxonomically added to other figures such as
metaphor and metonymy, but has a different ontological function” (72). In populist
movements ‘the people’, although it logically cannot represent the totality of the population,
presents itself as the populus, that is, as the entirety of the polity.
According to this approach, populism will thus be defined as a political movement
that: 1) articulates heterogeneous unsatisfied demands, thereby creating an original discursive
formation and a new ‘collective will’; 2) is based on the construction of equivalential links and
dichotomic frontiers as well as on the universalistic pretension of representing the totality of
the populus; and, 3) has an antagonistic and metapolitical approach, inasmuch as it seeks to
50
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question and transform the political landscape, both in terms of who is the hegemon and how
the political map looks like.
Thus, we shall define nationalpopulism as a type of populist movement in which the
nation acts as the key empty signifier, and in which hegemony is achieved thanks to a
nationalist stance which serves as a bonding agent for several, heterogeneous demands.
Nationalpopulism stems from a fusion of popular and national elements and sees the ‘national
people’ as the main political actor, a collective identity threatened by its generally foreign
antagonists and linked thanks to national symbols and common historical traits.
Inasmuch as nationalpopulism promotes “a sentiment or consciousness of belonging
to the nation” and it can be considered as “a social and political movement on behalf of the
nation,” it can be defined as a form of nationalism according to Anthony D. Smith’s classical
characterization (Smith 2001, 5). It also fits Alberto Martinelli’s definition of nationalism as an
ideology that “fosters specific collective movements and policies promoting the sovereignty,
unity, and autonomy of the people gathered in a single territory” (Martinelli 2018, 14).
Right-wing Nationalpopulism: the Plebeian Nation
This section seeks to dispel the myth that right-wing nationalism has always been
either related to socially conservative stances, or simply indifferent to any kind of social
policy. This perception is probably linked to the idea that nationalism is an ‘outward-looking’
ideology concerned with international affairs rather than with public policies, but also to a
general lack of knowledge about the several historical attempts by right-wing nationalist
movements to integrate social, economically illiberal concerns.
The most important examples of this social-national synthesis can be found in France,
Germany, and Italy during the late nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth
century. In 1898 Maurice Barrès, a French novelist and politician, coined the term ‘nationalsocialism’ and called to fight against an alleged political alliance between the Jewish people,
bankers, leftists, Germans, liberals, and cosmopolitans of any kind. Barrès was a fierce
supporter of Boulangism, a movement with both nationalist, revolutionary, populist and
Jacobin roots (Sternhell 1973, 1). A decade later, Oswald Spengler—one of the main exponents
of the Konservative Revolution—published “Prussianism and Socialism,” in which he offered
his idea of socialism as “a way of life” inseparable from authoritarianism, communitarianism,
and nationalism (Spengler 1908, 32). Around the same time, one of the most influential
thinkers of Nazism, although not a Nazi himself, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, defended his
idea of a “German socialism” based on social corporatism and revolutionary conservatism
(O’Sullivan 1983, 144-147).
In terms of political praxis, Charles Maurras, the leader of radical right party Action
Française, was one of the most ardent proponents of “embracing socialism after extricating it
from its cosmopolitan and democratic elements” (Sternhell 1994, 119). In Germany, a workerbased branch of Nazism called Strasserism, along with the hybrid movement of the NationalBolsheviks created by the former socialist militant Ernst Niekisch were the most prominent
expressions of the national-social blend during the interwar period.
But the climax of the social-national synthesis took place in Italy during and after the
Great War (1914-1918). As Massulli (2014) explains, the Italian revolutionary syndicalists had
an enormous influence in the advent of fascism. Both nationalists (such as Gabriele
d’Annunzio and Enrico Corradini) and former socialists (such as Michele Bianchi and Benito
Mussolini) understood the necessity of somehow associating both worldviews. The Italian
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socialist Arturo Labriola argued in 1910 that there were two types of nationalism: the
nationalism of the workers—popular and equalitarian—and the nationalism of the elites—
dishonest and imperialist (Sternhell 1994, 250). In the aftermath of the war the fasci di
combattimento and Associazione Nazionale Italiana, the embryos of the Partito Nazionale
Fascista (1921), were the main proponents of this form of national socialism whereby the ethnos
is a plebeian political subject opposed to unpatriotic elites.
Apart from Alceste de Ambris, the majority of Italian revolutionary syndicalists
(Agostino Lanzillo, Angelo Olivetti, Sergio Panunzio, Alfredo Rocco among others) reached
important positions within the fascist regime by promoting a plebeian, social and
revolutionary variety of nationalism that had also succeeded on the other side of the Alps,
although by taking a different form. The core idea running through this ideological
articulation can be summed up by Ramiro Ledesma’s famous statement (today surprisingly
parroted by the Spanish far-right party Vox): “Only the rich can permit themselves the luxury
of not having a homeland” (Jones 2019). There are thus two key elements: the articulation of
the social and the national and the idea that the motherland is a protection against anti-social
and alien disruptive forces.
This historical period, from the late nineteenth century to 1945, ‘the first social-national
synthesis’ ended up calamitously with the defeat of the Axis in 1945. It is not until the last
decade (with the exception of the surprisingly popular Movimento Sociale Italiano) that we
can find a serious attempt to articulate social and nationalist stances from the right in Europe.
Instead of a corporatist, revolutionary nationalist, or national-syndicalist force, it has emerged
as right-wing national populism (RWNP).
Here again it is necessary to start in France. In 2012 the Front National (rebranded as
Rassemblement National in 2018) became a party that rejected the left-right classification and
promoted a distinction between ‘the people’ (sometimes referred to as “the forgotten” who
“suffer in silence”) and ‘the elites’ (both French, European and global). Both elements were
part of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s discourse as well, especially during his last years as president of
the party when he flirted with populist strategies, but the difference is that in his case those
were rhetorical devices that didn’t represent the ethos of his Front National (Eltchaninoff
2017). In Marine Le Pen’s genuine populist project, however, the commitment to build a
dichotomic frontier between ‘the people’ and ‘the elites,’ and the preference for an ambiguous
discourse that ventures into traditionally liberal and leftist semantic domains, is of paramount
importance. This nationalpopulist stance, which includes many social elements, was mainly
envisioned by Florian Philippot, her former right-hand man (Fernández-Vázquez 2019).
Marine Le Pen often engages in RWNP discourses, and she does so in two ways. First,
she and her populist party seek to articulate a plurality of democratic demands that are social,
territorial, and cultural, and which are then presented as national problems from which the
‘French people’ is suffering. Second, the now popular demands are often deemed to be
solvable only by confronting an international, rather than national, antagonist. This
international antagonist has many faces—immigrants, Muslims, ‘global elites,’ European
bureaucrats and its French allies—but because populist discourses not only create
equivalences between demands but also between their opponents (that is, ‘the people’ and the
‘elite’ are both the product of discursive bricolage), the antagonist appears as an alliance
between different groups with shared interests. The idea at the heart of RWNP discourses is
that the nation and its people, who are here one and the same, are oppressed by non-national
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actors. Marine Le Pen provided good evidence of this when she accused the then French
president François Hollande of being “the vice-chancellor of the province of France for
Germany” and imposing austerity measures that only benefit Berlin (Bogani 2015).
Italy, probably the most important nation when it comes to social-national syntheses,
has also witnessed the emergence of RWNP stances. In reality, the social-national position did
not abruptly end in Italy in 1945, for it was to some extent defended by the neo-fascist
Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) until decades after. But Matteo Salvini’s Lega is far from
being a fascist movement, unlike the MSI or CasaPound, which are contemporary genuine
examples of such current (Gentile 2019). After all, it is clear that this former Padanian
secessionist, who has shifted his party from regionalism to Italian nationalism (and from 4%
to more than 34% of the vote), has espoused stances that are closer to Marine Le Pen than to
Giorgio Almirante.
Although at the moment Salvini seems to have opted for an alliance with other rightwing forces (mainly Forza Italia and Fratelli d’Italia) due to the incentives derived from the
architecture of the electoral system of his country, between June 2018 and September 2019 he
was Minister of the Interior in a coalition government with the Movimento 5 Stelle. It was
during that period that he adopted a RWNP discourse. In December 2018 he claimed that he
preferred “a government trusted by the people rather than one trusted by the international
markets” (Il Fato 2018). The problem of Europe, according to him, is that it is ruled “by the
finance oligarchy and those who permit mass immigration” (L’US 2019). After the European
Union rejected the 2018 Italian budget, which sought to introduce a universal basic income
and lower the retirement age, the so-called “people’s budget,” he urged EU leaders to “respect
the Italian people” (France24 2018). In October 2019, shortly after the end of the coalition
government, Salvini said he represented “the people against the elite, the squares against the
palaces” (popolo contro elite, piazza contro Palazzo) (ReggioSera, 2019).
Mirroring his ally Marine Le Pen, Salvini stated in 2018 that the power of banks, the
EU, austerity, mass immigration and economic precariousness are part of the same ‘regime’:
“the next elections [the European elections of 2019] are a referendum between the Europe of
the elites, of banks, of precariousness, of immigration, of austerity and the Europe of the
people and the workers” (Valenti 2018). Political elites, immigrants (and NGOs), banks, the
Left, EU bureaucrats… all conspire against ‘the (national) people,’ victims who just want good
jobs and a sovereign state that can protect them from the dangers of globalization. In a rally
in Milan with Le Pen and other leaders of the Western European radical right, Salvini cried
out against “this immigration which has submerged our nations, putting our people at risk”
(CGTN 2019).
Those who serve foreign elites are thus ‘traitors against the motherland,’ which is
exactly what Salvini accused Giuseppe Conte of being, because according to him he used
Italian money to rescue German and French banks (Salvini 2019). It is important to highlight
that the problem does not consist in using taxpayer’s money to rescue a bank, but to do so to
rescue a non-Italian bank. It is interesting to note that this nationalist momentum has prepared
the ground for the emergence of LWNP forces as well, such as Patria e Constituzione or VOX
Italia (created by the self-declared Marxist thinker Diego Fusaro).
Salvini and Le Pen claim to confront both mass immigration, Islamism, and the
economic and political elites. This is why the idea of RWNP as a discourse that focuses on the
construction of vertical frontiers instead of horizontal, ‘people versus elites,’ held by
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Hameleers (2018, 6) and by Gilles Gressani (2019, 77) is a misconception. If anything, it could
be said that it promotes a diagonal frontier, including both ‘the establishment’ and nonnationals, who are somehow part of the same group of interest (this is why the conspiracy
theory of le grand remplacement, formulated by Rénaud Camus, is so appealing for RWNP
militants). The idea that there is an alliance between the economic and political elites and
ethnic minorities might seem extravagant, but it is certainly not an innovative view in the
history of the radical right (Hanebrink 2018; Baker 2006).
Therefore, the basic idea is that ‘the people’ has been left behind and its social and
cultural demands are not satisfied by a political system that would rather serve the interests
of immigrants, Muslims, and foreign elites. This inevitably reminds us of nationalist or farright movements. Yet RWNP is different from these at least in two ways. First of all, it is not
just a reactive and xenophobic movement, and contrary to other radical right forces, neither
Rassemblement National nor La Lega are niche parties. As a populist movement, RWNP
formulates “a certain historical horizon” (Laclau 2005, 116), that is, it presents a socio-political
alternative and promises to bring a new state of things into existence. And secondly, it links
popular discontent not only with an ‘unpatriotic elite’ (co-opted by foreign actors) but also
with the need of reinforcing or at least defending the social assistance that was built during
the trente glorieuses, thereby fueling the so-called Welfare chauvinism (Ennser-Jedenastik
2017).
RWNP is certainly popular and plebeian but, so to speak, in a völkisch way. It offers a
vision of its country as an underdog in the international arena while including social concerns,
which inevitably reminds us of Enrico Corradini’s idea of Italy being a “proletarian nation”
both morally and materially (Corner 2012). It bases its vision on the idea that both
international relations and the distribution of social resources are highly competitive, and that
the nation and its people must be protected from such a hostile world. This had led politicians
like Salvini or Le Pen to subscribe to realist positions, flirting both with China and Russia
while at the same time acknowledging the economic importance of the EU (Lafont 2017).
Today’s proponents of the right-wing social-national synthesis are inspired by
economists such as Maurice Allais (a fierce critic of globalization and ‘the free-trade
ideology’), Bruno Lemaire and Louis Alliot (who consider that sovereignty and social
expenditure are interconnected), and Bernard Monot (who praises state intervention and
seeks to find a third way between liberalism and anticapitalism). In Italy, Alberto Bagnai (who
defines himself as a Eurosceptic post-Keynesian left-wing populist despite being La Lega’s
main economist) claims that only the nation-state can guarantee social dignity to workers
(Petti 2013). Bagnai declared himself nationalist, populist, and socialist (Bagnai, 2013). His
colleague Claudio Borghi, who shares Bagnai’s hard Euroscepticism, associates monetary
sovereignty with social well-being (Carli 2018).
All of them are critics of the current economic state of affairs and are clearly concerned
with social welfare. They oppose neoliberal arrangements and the ‘end of politics’, two key
factors of the emergence of populist forces, as Chantal Mouffe noted (Mouffe 2004, 48). Yet
their anti-globalization stance must be nuanced: as was the case with interwar fascists
(Paxton,2004, 10), their rhetoric against the markets, the finance and international treaties is
always selective. RWNP forces do not pretend to replace the current economic system, but
rather to reinforce the possibilities of their nations to compete in it. In a highly competitive
world, only by protecting their economies from immigration and globalization, they think,
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they can also protect ‘their people’.
Left-wing Nationalpopulism: the Nationalization of the People
The idea of associating social and nationalist elements as a leftist strategy was much
less popular than the opposite during the first social-national synthesis. It can be considered
as a punctual and calculated strategy rather than as a genuine and enduring political
articulation. For example, in the context of the rise of fascism in Germany the KPD understood
during a brief period of time the utility of being at the forefront of the national opposition
against the “imperialist Versailles Treaty” (Moreau, 2018, 161). Leon Trotsky, referring to the
same country in 1930, encouraged the German proletariat to strategically “put itself at the
head of the nation as its leader” (Beetham, 2019, 205).
Yet there are historical examples of left-wing social-national syntheses, especially at
the beginning of the 20th century, a period marked by a profound crisis of Marxism and the
resulting frustration of some socialist militants (Sternhell 1994, 15). The French philosopher
Georges Sorel, author of Réflexions sur la violence (published in 1908), paved the way for the
idea that the Left had to find new mobilizing myths instead of focusing on rationalist and
economist discourses. The already mentioned Italian revolutionary syndicalists, deeply
influenced by Sorel, saw in national consciousness and war mobilization the opportunity to
appropriate powerful myths and symbols. “The motherland shouldn’t be rejected, but seized”
(La patria non se contesta, ma se conquista), were the famous words of Edmondo Rossoni, leader
of the Unione Italiana del Lavoro in 1918, a sentence later repeated by a still socialist Benito
Mussolini.
But the post-colonial world was and remains certainly a much more appropriate
context for this type of social nationalism. In Latin America, Africa, and Asia, the nationalbuilding process took place at the same time as the anti-colonial struggle. It was also impacted
by Marxism and by Soviet support, both before and after the Second World War (Young 2001,
161-167). Ernesto Laclau himself took an active part in a LWNP Argentinean party, the Partido
Socialista de la Izquierda Nacional, during the sixties. Today, in the majority of LatinAmerican countries (Bolivia, Argentina and Venezuela are probably the best-known
examples), it is possible to find left-wing political parties which advocate nationalist positions,
both against their national adversaries and against Washington. The case of Europe is exactly
the opposite, inasmuch as since the end of nineteenth century nationalism in this continent
has conservative, authoritarian and xenophobic connotations (Hobsbawm 1990, 101-107).
This is why the rise of the Greek party Syriza at the beginning of this decade was such
a surprising phenomenon. Syriza was created in 2004 as a coalition of different radical left
groups (with Synaspismos, a Eurocommunist organization, as its major member), but around
2010 it shifted toward a populist strategy (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). The populist
turn proved successful; Syriza climbed from 4% of the votes in 2009 to 16% in 2012 and 28%
in 2015. Alexis Tsipras, the leader of the coalition since 2009, was inspired by the 2010-2012
anti-austerity movement (the so-called Aganaktisménon- Politón, ‘movement of the outraged’)
and by the several work-based mobilizations of the period, which included several general
strikes. He then realized that there was a possibility to articulate a plurality of demands that
neither PASOK (the socialist party, in government between 2009 and 2011) nor, of course, the
conservatives could satisfy. Syriza never became a nationalpopulist party, nor can it be
compared with Salvini’s Lega or Le Pen’s Rassemblement National. However, it did engage
in LWNP discourses, although only in certain circumstances. It is significant that both during
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the first and the second Tsipras governments (2015-2019), Sryiza’s junior coalition partner was
Independent Greeks, a Greek nationalist right-wing party.
This unnatural alliance took place in a context in which austerity and economic crisis
were associated by many Greeks with foreign interference. After all, the European Union, led
by Germany, was perceived as the political actor behind the public spending cuts and the
several tax increases. A wave of Euroscepticism swept through the country, to the point that
in January 2014 Nigel Farage became highly popular among many anti-austerity Greeks
(Smith 2014). Still, today Greece maintains a less favorable view of the EU (Pew Research
Center, 2018) and of Germany (Pew Research Center, 2019). The narrative supported both by
the German government and by some German media only worsened the situation (Kutter
2014). Moreover, Greece was continuously discredited by the three main rating agencies
(Moody's Investors Service, Standard & Poor's and Fitch Ratings), all of them American.
This was obviously a favorable environment for Greek ultranationalism. The neofascist party Golden Dawn won 7% of the votes in 2015 and became the country’s third
political force, whereas the Independent Greeks (Syriza’s partners) won almost the 5%.
During the strikes and the anti-austerity marches, both European and German flags were
burned on several occasions. However, Tsipras was always careful not to fall into the trap of
xenophobic discourses, and Syriza’s relationship with nationalism from 2012 to 2015 is very
different than that of its far-right partner. Analyzing it will provide us with valuable
information to understand LWNP.
First of all, it is important to analyze the role of nationalism and of national
consciousness in shaping the political identity formed from the links between the different
social demands. Stavrakakis and Katsambekis (2014, 10) draw attention to how Tsipras and
Syriza continuously employed the word ‘people’ in order to identify their supporters and
create the idea of a homogenous and united group, ready to oppose ‘the establishment.’ Yet it
is important to note that, at least since the January 2015 Greek legislative election, Tsipras
started to refer to ‘the people’ as ‘the Greek people,’ ‘our people,’ and ‘our country’. The
nation, and not the leader or the signifier ‘people,’ became the empty signifier of Syriza’s
discursive formation. But here the nation is not an ethnic entity, but a popular one. Because
both RWNP and LWNP discourses employ the signifier ‘the people’ we can be lead to
confusion, but in Syriza’s case it is clear that he refers to the people as plebs (as a subaltern,
popular group) and not as ethnos (an ethnic or racial group). Therefore, instead of the nation
being ‘popularized,’ the people, meaning here the economically subaltern, are ‘nationalized.’
And so here the nation and the plebs are one.
This ephemeral nationalist turn was probably inevitable, since the Greek
government’s main adversaries were at that moment international, or foreign, actors. A few
days after Syriza’s victory, Tsipras and other members of his government paid homage to the
Greek communists who fought against the Nazis during the war. In a moment of increased
tensions with Angela Merkel’s government, Panos Skourletis, spokesman of Syriza, declared
that the symbolic act “represents national resistance to occupation, but also the natural desire
of Greeks for freedom, for liberty from German occupation” (Smith 2015). It is therefore hardly
surprising that the Syntagma Square was filled with national flags during the June 25, 2015
referendum, when Greek voters rejected austerity proposals from the country’s creditors.
Secondly, during this brief period from 2014-2015 the antagonist was no longer the
national elite or establishment, but foreign powers. Certainly both PASOK and New
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Democracy, the two main parties prior to Syriza’s dramatic ascendancy, were denounced as
the culprits of the malaise of the people, but the Greek elite were now presented as allies of
European and German actors. Yanis Varoufakis, the Minister of Finance from January to July
2015, claimed in August of that same year that “the European leaders” act collusively with
“Greek oligarchs” in order to allow them “to maintain their stranglehold on Greek society
while punishing ordinary people” (Inman 2015). The tension between Varoufakis and the
German government only increased when 2013 footage of him saying that Greece “should
simply default on its debts and stick the finger to Germany” became viral (The Economist,
2015).
Syriza undoubtedly embraced a nationalist discourse that emphasized nationalpopular resistance against foreign, and powerful, enemies, with a focus on Germany and, to
a lesser extent, the European Union. The movement had no problems with making
problematic historical analogies. Is there really any difference with Salvini’s or Le Pen’s
approach? In fact, and despite what some media commentators may think, there are at least
three. First of all, Syriza’s LWNP discourses were always internationalist, or at least
regionalist. Tsipras and Varoufakis always underlined that their struggle was a European one,
inasmuch as they genuinely intended to “free Europe” from austerity (Konstantinidis 2015).
Secondly, Syriza, understanding the importance of the European project beyond its economic
aspects, was always reluctant to fall into hard Euroscepticism. Its critique of the EU was
always self-limited and hardly survived the year 2015. Finally, and this might be the key
difference between European and Latin-American LWNP, Syriza’s nationalist stance was only
situational and, contrary to RWNP forces, it was never part of the party’s discursive essence.
Instead of being the product of the union of different pre-existing left-wing parties, the
Spanish party Podemos was created in 2014 as a self-conscious populist force opposed both
to the socialists and to the far left. Pablo Iglesias’ party abandoned to some extent its populist
strategy during the year 2016, when the Spanish political system began to rearticulate and he
decided to form an alliance with the far-left party Izquierda Unida, thereby changing its name
to Unidas Podemos (United We Can). Prior to that, Podemos was a very particular example
of populism, for it consciously operated by using Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s works
as its strategic guideline (Errejón and Mouffe 2015, 7; Alcántara 2015), so much so that it could
be described as a ‘Laclauian party’. The main founders of Podemos, including Iglesias, also
drew inspiration from several Latin-American nationalpopulist movements. This prepared
the ground for a political force eager to articulate all kind of heterogeneous demands and very
calculating when it came to language and discourse. Its capacity to transcend the discursive
milieu from which it comes from (the Spanish Left) is probably only comparable to Marine Le
Pen’s.
Podemos’ LWNP momentum overlapped with that of Syriza (2014-2015) with the
creation of the party in January 2014, although as we shall see, some nationalpopulist elements
persist today within the party and surface from time to time. Pablo Iglesias and Alexis Tsipras
were close allies during this period. Iglesias travelled to Athens the day before the Greek
legislative election and claimed that “the Greeks won’t bow the knee before Germany, they
don’t want to go back to the past [a reference to the Nazi occupation of Greece], they know
Tsipras is a lion (sic) that will defend its people despite everything” (Velasco 2015). A few
months before, he stated that Greece deserved “to have a patriotic president who can protect
the interests of the people” (Gil 2015). After Syriza’s victory, he basically paraphrased Marine
Le Pen’s abovementioned remark on François Hollande being Merkel’s vice chancellor by
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saying he was happy that Greece “will have a Greek president and not a representative of
Merkel” (Carvajal 2015).
Iglesias, always willing to flirt with positions unfamiliar to the Spanish left, went as
far as to declare that he didn’t want Spain to be “the country that serves beers and tapas to rich
people from northern Europe” and that “it is clear that Angela Merkel wants us to be a colony”
(Berlunes 2014). This eagerness to engage in LWNP discourses cannot but seem strange in a
European context and it is probably due to the enormous influence that some Latin-American
political experiences exerted on Podemos.
But Brussels is not Washington, and Spain is not Argentina or Venezuela. Even if Spain
is, along with Greece, the only European country in which people on the ideological left are
more likely to give the EU negative marks (Pew Research Center 2018), Podemos hasn’t been
able to successfully articulate a nationalpopulist discourse, among other things because, like
Syriza, it has been reluctant to fall into Euroscepticism. Not to mention the fact that for
historical reasons in Spain the national symbols are associated to the Right. This is actually far
from being anomalous: it is also the case, for example, in countries such as Japan and England,
whose national symbols have problematic connotations. In fact, the whole approach seemed
somewhat artificial and, to some extent, the result of the lack of alternatives. For as Errejón
himself declared: “there are only three great political aggregators in modernity: religion, class
and nation” and only the third is available today (Neyra 2017).
Be that as it may, Podemos’ nationalpopulist discourse is a good example of the two
traits that have been here identified as the core of LWNP—the merging of the plebs and the
nation and the construction of a dichotomic frontier against foreign powers. The first is an
attempt to ‘nationalize the people,’ which consists of associating popular demands with a
defense of the nation. In February 2015, Iglesias said that “the fatherland is having a good
public healthcare system, the fatherland is having the possibility of sending your son to a good
school, the fatherland is having a good economy so you don’t have to emigrate” (Jiménez
2015). His then right-hand man, Iñigo Errejón, accused the Spanish socialists of being “false
patriots” when they organized a rally with an enormous national flag: “you are traitors,
because you gave Spain’s sovereignty to Merkel…if you really want to be patriots, that has
nothing to do with flags, it has to do with defending the hospitals, the schools, the workers”
(Aroca 2015). This very calculated nationalpopulist approach began to fade after 2016
(although Iñigo Errejón tried to refloat it recently with his new party, Más País), but LWNP
stances are still present in Podemos, especially since it has now to face a far-right adversary,
Vox.
The second key characteristic of LWNP discourse, the shift from a national to an
international dichotomic frontier, was only possible during the height of the Greek
government-debt crisis (2014-2016), when Syriza opposed Germany and the European Union
even though Greece ultimately accepted their conditions. Thus, Podemos’ nationalist attitude
(which went further than Syriza’s) necessarily overlapped with that of its Greek ally. After
that brief moment of European division and apparent north/south confrontation, the
‘nationalpopulist moment’ was over for left-wing European parties. Their right-wing
counterparts did not have to face that issue because the type of nationalpopulism that they
formulated did not depend on economic crisis or regional clashes. European LWNP, on the
other hand, remains a rare and occasional type of political stance. It was probably only
possible in a very particular context in which a huge economic crisis coexisted with austerity
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measures, economic international interference, and Angela Merkel playing the role of an
arrogant northern ruler against southern subaltern countries.
In order to draw a parallel between today’s national-social synthesis and the several
experiments carried out by right-wing nationalist forces, we mentioned political figures such
as Enrico Corradini and Charles Maurras. This section will end with the words of EmmanuelJoseph Sieyès, whose 1789 reflections on the people and the nation fit with such accuracy with
this section that it is impossible not to quote him. The abbé unwittingly describes two staples
of LWNP as it has been analyzed here: its consideration that only the plebs is part of the nation
and its aspirations to represent the totality of it.
The nobility, however, is also a foreigner in our midst because of its civil and
political prerogatives. (…) The Third Estate then contains everything that
pertains to the nation while nobody outside the Third Estate can be considered
as part of the nation. What is the Third Estate? Everything.
Conclusions
RWNP can be defined as a sort of plebeian nationalism, while LWNP is a form of
nationalization of the people. In the first, the nation is victimized, and the ethnos is
popularized. In the second, there is an isomorphism between the plebs and the nation. Whereas
RWNP is one of the contemporary forms that the radical right can take, European LWNP is a
punctual strategy embraced by political forces that are part of the democratic socialist and
post-communist sphere. Podemos and Syriza were eager to criticize the EU and the German
government at a certain point, but they were reluctant to support Eurosceptic postulates. On
the other hand, both Rassemblement National and La Lega have Euroscepticism as one of
their main ideological traits.
In Europe, RWNP is less an anomaly than LWNP, a political stance more common in
the third world, especially in Latin America, for historical reasons. While the synthesis
between nationalism and popular or social positions has been historically successful in Europe
when it was carried by right-wing movements, the opposite is generally not the case.
However, the example of Greece and Spain during the Eurozone debt crisis shows that the
possibility of articulating a LWNP discourse exists in our continent.
The points of departure of RWNP and LWNP are thus different, and so are their
intentions and their ideological forebears. It is important, both for political scientists and for
citizens, to be able to distinguish between these two tendencies. We are already witnessing
the spread of the misleading idea that left-wing and right-wing populism are pretty similar
phenomena. Insofar as nationalpopulist forces employ a similar vocabulary and propose
similar policies, there will always be a risk of confusion. Only an in-depth discourse analysis
can avoid it.
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